Recent years have seen extensive investigation of the information aggregation properties of prediction markets. However, relatively little is known about conditions under which a market will aggregate the private information of rational risk averse traders who optimize their portfolios over time; in particular, what features of a market encourage traders to ultimately reveal their private information through trades?
INTRODUCTION
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price of an event is low relative to the likelihood that it will occur, then at least some traders should find it profitable to buy-and thus the price will go up. In this way, the expectation is that prices in prediction markets aggregate the information available to individual traders [16] .
This basic goal has led to extensive investigation of the information aggregation properties of prediction markets. More broadly, however, the notion that information is aggregated in market prices has been a longstanding topic of study in economics; for example, see [7, 10, 12, 17] . Roughly speaking, the idea that market prices should reflect the information collectively possessed by market participants is a form of the efficient markets hypothesis [9] , and underlies much of the appeal of decentralized markets in settings where traders possess asymmetric information.
Despite the central connection between information aggregation and market behavior, significant open problems remain. In particular, relatively little is known about conditions under which a market will aggregate the private information of rational risk-averse traders who optimize their portfolios over time. The central goal of this paper is to investigate conditions under which information is aggregated in such scenarios.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. Smoothness and information aggregation. Our main result identifies a basic smoothness condition on prices in the market that ensures information will be aggregated. Formally, we show that if the portfolios held by traders converge over time, and the limiting price charged by the market maker is continuously differentiable at zero with respect to the quantity traded, then the market will aggregate information in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This is an interesting result, because in particular it suggests the per unit price for a small purchase and a small sale should be essentially the same-that is, there should be no bid-ask spread near zero quantity.
We note that without such a smoothness condition, it is possible that information aggregation may fail. In particular, if a rational market maker is sufficiently concerned that traders possess significantly superior information regarding the value of a traded asset, then prices may be set in a manner that completely precludes trading and thus the dissemination of information [7] . Our main contribution is to demonstrate that a smoothness assumption on the market encourages trade and thus the diffusion of the information available to the individual traders. Notably, many algo-rithmic market makers used in prediction markets are smooth in the sense we require; in particular, we give conditions under which cost function market makers (or, equivalently, market makers based on market scoring rules) satisfy the smoothness requirement.
2. Markets with risk averse traders. The market model we consider involves finitely many informed risk-averse traders interacting with a market maker. This is distinct from prior work in this area [4, 5, 15] , which primarily considered information aggregation among traders that are risk neutral.
This modeling choice is significant for two reasons. First, in many markets, risk aversion is important. For example, traders may bid on contracts in prediction markets as insurance to hedge against risks inherent in other elements of their portfolio. Second, if all traders and the market maker are risk neutral and rational, then in general, the no-trade theorem applies and precludes trade [14] . Informally, the problem is that two rational risk neutral traders cannot take opposing positions in the market and both expect to be better off. However, with risk aversion trading can proceed even if all traders are rational: traders may trade purely on the motive of hedging.
The most closely related paper to our work is by Ostrovsky [15] . He shows that if the securities under consideration are "separable" in an appropriate sense, and all traders are risk neutral, then information is aggregated in markets based on the competitive dealer model of Kyle [12] , as well as in markets based on market scoring rules. The markets we consider are complete with respect to payoff-relevant uncertainty (i.e., there exists one contingent contract for each possible payoff-relevant event that can occur); and with the partition model for signal structure that Ostrovsky considers, a complete market is always separable.
1 Our main innovation is in studying markets with risk averse traders, and establishing the aforementioned smoothness condition as essential to information aggregation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define our basic model, including the game played by market participants, as well as perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. In Section 3, we formally define information aggregation. In Section 4, we claim that if the portfolios of traders converge and the market is asymptotically smooth, then information is aggregated. In Section 5, we show that the portfolio convergence assumption can be relaxed in markets where the signal space of traders is finite, and the loss to the market maker is bounded; the latter condition is satisfied by a wide range of algorithmic market makers based on cost functions, as we observe in Section 6.
Market Operation
We consider a market consisting of n traders and organized by a market maker. Trading takes place in the market sequentially at an infinite sequence of times t ∈ {1, 2, · · · }. In particular, at time t the trader it engages in trade with the market maker, and the sequence {it} is known a priori to all the traders and the market maker. We further assume that each trader visits the market infinitely often.
The uncertainty in the value of future securities is captured by a random variableω taking values in the finite set Ω = {1, · · · , m}; we refer to the random variableω as the payoff-relevant state of the world, and assume that all traders have a common prior distribution forω. We assume that the payoff-relevant state is only revealed after all trades are completed. Further, we assume the market for securities over payoff-relevant uncertainty, i.e., possible realizations of ω, is complete. That is, we assume traders can trade in any of m securities labeled 1, . . . , m; one share of security ω pays $1 in state ω, and 0 otherwise. Note that we do not make the assumption of complete markets over all sources of uncertainty. In particular, we do not assume that traders can trade over payoff-irrelevant events that do not directly effect the trader's preferences.
Suppose that trader it = i visits the market at time t to trade with the market maker. Let yt ∈ R m denote the corresponding trade, where the component yt(ω) is the quantity of security ω bought by the trader i at time t. The history ht at time t as observed by the traders (and the market maker) consists of all the trades until time t. In other words, we have ht = (y1, y2, · · · , yt−1) .
As a matter of convention, we let h1
∅ denote the null history at time 1. We denote by Ht the set of all possible histories up to time t, and let H f = ∪ t≥1 Ht denote the set of all possible finite histories. Finally, let h∞ = (y1, y2, · · · ) denote the infinite history, or the path taken by the market, and let H∞ denote the set of all possible infinite histories.
The portfolio of a trader i at time t consists of the different quantities of each security she holds. Let wi,t(ω) denote the quantity of security ω held by trader i at time t; we refer to the vector wi,t as the portfolio of trader i at time t. We assume that the initial portfolio of each trader is common knowledge among the traders and the market maker.
Observe that if a trader holds the portfolio 1 = (1, . . . , 1), i.e., one unit of each security, then the trader receives a payoff of $1 regardless of the realized state. For this reason we refer to the 1 portfolio as money, and throughout the paper we interpret monetary payment of $x to or from a trader as credits or debits of x units of the 1 portfolio.
The market maker determines the price for trades of different quantities of the securities; this price may depend on the history. In particular, we let K(ht, y) represent the price charged for a portfolio y after history ht; thus the trader's net trade at time t is yt − K(ht, yt)1. We assume the functional form of K is known to all traders a priori. To reflect the fact that the trade in the market is voluntary, we assume that the pricing function K does not penalize any trader for not participating in the market. More precisely, we assume that after any history ht, the pricing function satisfies K(ht, 0) = 0, where 0 = (0, . . . , 0). Furthermore, we assume that the pricing function satisfies the following assumption:
(1)
The above condition ensures that the traders do not profit via an exchange of money with the market maker. Another implication is that the market maker prices the trades considering only the risk involved in the trade.
The Game and Equilibrium
In this section our main goal is to define our equilibrium concept, perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Informally, PBE requires that traders' strategies maximize their utility given their beliefs over any uncertain elements of the model, and their beliefs are consistent with the strategies adopted by other traders in equilibrium. In our model, uncertainty arises because the payoff-relevant stateω is unknown; however, we assume traders are informed, and receive signals regarding the true state. In this section we define signals, beliefs, strategies, utility, and, ultimately, PBE.
It should be noted that, to be precise, these constructs should be defined in a measure-theoretic framework. However, for clarity of exposition we suppress measure-theoretic details in the main text; in Appendix A we provide a formal measure-theoretic description of each of the elements introduced here.
Signals. Before trading begins, each trader i receives a private signalsi ∈ Σi. We assume that the private signals are drawn independently conditional on the stateω, and that the joint distribution ofω and the signals is common knowledge among the traders. Let P denote the joint prior distribution ofω ands1, . . . ,sn. We refer tos = (s1, · · · ,sn) as the joint signal and Σ = ×iΣi as the joint signal space.
Beliefs. Let S = H∞ × Ω × Σ. Observe that an element of S captures all uncertainty in the model: the path of the market, the payoff-relevant state, and the signals of all the traders. All uncertainty can therefore be represented by probability distributions over this space. In particular, we assume that after each history ht, and having observed signal si, trader i's belief νi(ht, si) is a probability distribution over S. This represents trader i's forecast of the future actions by traders, the stateω, and the signal vectors.
Strategies. The trader i is said to follow the strategy δi if, after a history h ∈ H f , the trader selects a trading decision according to the distribution specified by δi(h, si), where si denotes the private signal received by the trader. (Of course, a trader i can only trade at those times where it = i.) Let yt(δi, ht) denote the trade specified by the strategy δi at time t. If δi is a mixed strategy, then yt(δi, ht) is the realized trade when trader i chooses her trade according to δi. Note that the distribution of yt(δi, ht) at time t depends only on the realized history ht and the private signalsi. When the context is clear, we will omit the explicit history dependence. Let δ = (δ1, · · · , δn) denote the strategy profile where each trader i follows the strategy δi. Also, for each i, let δ−i = (δj) (j =i) denote the strategy of every player except i.
Note that the strategy profile δ, together with the common prior distribution P over the payoff-relevant state of the world and the signals, define a probability measure Q δ over the space S.
Utility and the value function. We assume that if trader i is holding a portfolio wi, and the payoff-relevant stateω = ω is realized, then trader i obtains a utility ui(ω, wi(ω)). The utility function ui : Ω × R → R of each trader is common knowledge among the traders and the market maker. We consider traders who are risk averse, and who, all else being equal, prefer greater wealth to less wealth. These two characteristics of the traders are captured by assuming that, for each trader i and each payoff-relevant state ω, the function ui(ω, ·) strictly increasing and concave. We further make the assumption in our analysis that each function ui(ω, ·) is differentiable. Note that all these assumptions hold trivially for risk neutral traders, whose utility functions are given by ui(ω, x) = x for all ω ∈ Ω, x ∈ R.
While we assume that traders act as expected utility maximizers, as trading proceeds over an infinite horizon, defining their objective precisely is somewhat subtle. In particular, if the history up to time t is ht, the strategy profile is δ, and trader i's belief is νi, then trader i's value function at time t is:
We assume that traders act at each time period to maximize their value function. To motivate our assumption on trader behavior, assume for a moment that the portfolio of the agent converges over time. Then the quantity limT →∞ ui((ω, wi,T (ω)) is the final utility of the trader i at the conclusion of trading in the market. Thus the value function captures the expected utility of the eventual portfolio of the trader. Defining the value function in terms of the limit inferior is a generalization that allows us to capture a broader class of possible trader behaviors, not being restricted to only those cases where portfolio convergence is assured. This approach is common, for example, in the literature on infinite horizon dynamic programming problems. It must be noted that the value function is not time separable over the trades at different time periods, and there is no discounting involved for trades occurring at later periods. We assume that for all cases of interest, the value functions are well defined at all times for all traders. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Finally, we describe the notion of PBE for the market defined above. We say the strategy profile δ and the beliefs νi for each i constitute a PBE if the following two conditions hold :
1. For each i, for each ht ∈ Ht and almost all si ∈ Σi, we have
2. For each i, we have νi(h, si)(·) = Q δ ( · |h,si = si) for all histories h where the latter conditional distribution is well defined.
The first condition requires that after any history, the actions specified by the strategy δi for trader i are optimal, holding fixed the strategies of all the other traders. The second condition requires that after any history, the traders update their beliefs through Bayes' rule whenever possible.
Whenever we consider a particular PBE with strategy profile δ, we append δ as a superscript to all the relevant quan-tities. Thus, for example, w δ i,t denotes the portfolio of trader i at time t in the PBE with strategy profile δ.
INFORMATION AGGREGATION
In this section, we will define the notion of information aggregation. Informally, this is when the private signals observed by individual traders are aggregated into a common market belief. In order to give a precise definition, we begin by defining some notation.
Fix a PBE with strategy profile δ and beliefs {νi}. Recall that Q δ is the joint probability measure induced on the space S by the strategy profile δ and the common prior distribution P over state and signals. For much of our analysis, we require notation for the belief of an uninformed market observer who is able to observe market transactions, is aware of all common knowledge, and shares the same prior distribution as market participants. In particular, we define ϕt as the common belief of the market over the state and signals at time t, by
This notion of a common belief is an important tool in analyzing dynamic games with asymmetric information: e.g., in models of rational learning [2] , herding [18] , and reputation [13] . A similar idea was applied by Ostrovsky in his work on information aggregation [15] . Further, trader i has beliefs that are informed by both the history of trading and the private signal observed. We define ϕi,t to be the belief of trader i over the state and signals at time t, and in a PBE this will be given by
Note that ϕt and ϕi,t have implicit history dependence. Moreover, trivially, ϕi,t can be obtained from ϕt by conditioning on trader i's signal: ϕi,t(·) = ϕt(·|si = s).
The following result is common in analysis of PBE in infinite horizon games: it establishes that beliefs converge to well-defined limits. The proof, which is omitted, involves writing the probabilities as a Doob martingale and then applying the martingale convergence theorem. Lemma 1. Under the measure Q δ , almost surely, the sequence of beliefs ϕt (resp., ϕi,t) converges weakly to a probability distribution ϕ∞ (resp., ϕi,∞), where
We are now ready to make the main definition.
Definition 1. (Information Aggregation)
The market aggregates the information of the traders if, almost surely, for all ω ∈ Ω, ϕ∞(ω = ω) = P(ω = ω|s).
On the left hand side, we have the posterior common belief of the market after the infinite trading history has been observed. On the right hand side, we have the posterior distribution of the state if all traders' signals could be pooled. Thus, information aggregation requires that, via the trading history, the common market belief completely pools the private signals of the traders.
Note that the above definition does not require that the prices of the securities reflect the posterior beliefs of the traders. Our definition only requires that an uninformed outsider sharing the common knowledge and prior distribution of the traders, and having knowledge of the sequence of trades conducted, should be able to infer the relevant information in the private joint signal.
ASYMPTOTIC SMOOTHNESS
A central theme of our paper is that if the prices set by the market maker are sufficiently "smooth" with respect to small purchases or sales by traders, then information will be aggregated. Formally, we introduce the following condition: Assumption 1. (Asymptotic Smoothness) Consider a strategy profile δ and the associated induced distribution Q δ . We assume that there exists an open neighborhood N of zero so that almost surely under the distribution Q δ , K(ht, ·) converges uniformly over N as t → ∞. Further, defining the limit
for y ∈ N , we require that K(h∞, ·) be almost surely continuously differentiable over N .
The above condition ensures that, asymptotically, if a trader buys or sells an infinitesimal portfolio, the marginal price is the same. This rules out the possibility of a nonzero bidask spread for infinitesimal trades. Note that such nonzero bid-ask spreads have been observed in prior models, e.g., in the limit-order book model with adverse selection as studied by Glosten [6] . Further, although we have stated asymptotic smoothness as a property of the pricing function K, it may alternatively be viewed as the property of the underlying equilibrium. In other words, one might consider equilibria where the behavior of the market marker arises endogenously. In such settings, if the induced pricing function K that arises from the market maker's activity is asymptotically smooth, then our results apply.
Additionally, we will make the following assumption on the equilibria under consideration: Assumption 2. (Portfolio Convergence) Under the strategy profile δ, the portfolio of each trader converges as trading proceeds in the market. In other words, for each trader i, the limit
exists (and is finite) almost surely.
Portfolio convergence captures the idea that, asymptotically, traders will stop trading despite the fact that infinitely many trading opportunities are available. Note that in our model, the private information about security payoffs is revealed to individual traders at the start of trading. Over time, no new information is revealed to the collective of market participants, existing information is merely diffused. Hence, it seems reasonable in this setting that if the market is wellfunctioning, the portfolios will eventually converge. In this way, one can view Assumption 2 as excluding pathological equilibria. In what follows, however, we will develop conditions on the underlying model primitives which allow the verification of portfolio convergence of the equilibrium and demonstrate that this holds in many common markets.
The following theorem, which is the main result of this section, shows information is aggregated if the previous two assumptions hold. Theorem 1. In any PBE where asymptotic smoothness (Assumption 1) and portfolio convergence (Assumption 2) hold, the market aggregates the information of the traders.
The proof of the theorem is technical and we omit it for compactness. The complete proof is available at [11] ; here we provide some intuition for the result. In a PBE, each trader starts with private information which may not be reflected in the pricing function of the market maker. As long as the information of any trader is not fully incorporated into the pricing function, asymptotic smoothness (Assumption 1) suggests that, eventually, the trader should be able to profit from trading infinitesimal quantities of the appropriate securities. Portfolio convergence (Assumption 2) in the PBE, on the other hand, suggests that asymptotically the trader does not exploit any such opportunities. We therefore expect that all the information of an individual trader will ultimately be incorporated into the prices, and hence information aggregation will occur.
INFORMATION AGGREGATION WITH A FINITE SIGNAL SPACE
Although the assumption of portfolio convergence is reasonable, it is a condition that depends on the equilibrium itself, rather than model primitives. In particular, one goal of our paper is to develop an information aggregation result that applies to a wide range of algorithmic market makers. For many such market makers, especially those based on cost functions (or equivalently, market scoring rules), the market maker employs a pricing function that ensures the total loss by the market maker over any trajectory of the market remains bounded. In this section, we specialize to a model where the signal space Σi of each trader i is finite, and show that if the loss to the market maker is bounded, then information is aggregated. In the next section, we discuss the application of this result to algorithmic market makers.
The loss incurred by the market maker is given by the net change in the portfolio of all the traders. Thus the loss of the market maker at time t, if the state realized isω = ω, is given by P n i=1 (wi,t(ω) − wi,0(ω)). The assumption we make is that in the PBE, the market maker's loss is bounded; this is equivalent to the following statement. 
for all ω ∈ Ω.
The following theorem shows that under the preceding assumption, information is aggregated in any pure strategy PBE, i.e., a PBE where traders play deterministic actions after each history.
Theorem 2. If the signal space is finite, then in any pure strategy PBE satisfying asymptotic smoothness (Assumption 1) and bounded loss (Assumption 3), the market aggregates the information of the traders.
The complete proof is available at [11] . The main idea is to establish that, for a pure strategy PBE, bounded loss (Assumption 3) implies portfolio convergence (Assumption 2) if the signal space is finite. To see this, observe that the bounded loss assumption prevents the net portfolio of all the traders from increasing without bound. Further, since the traders are free to not participate in the market, no trader's portfolio can grow without bound at the expense of another trader. These two facts imply that if the portfolio of a trader does not converge, there must be persistent oscillations. However, in that case, we can construct a (unilateral) profitable deviation for the trader, contradicting the assumption that the traders are in a PBE. Given portfolio convergence, the proof of the theorem then follows from an application of Theorem 1.
COST FUNCTION MARKET MAKER
In this section we focus our attention on a class of algorithmic market makers defined via cost functions. In such a market, the price seen by a trader is set by a fixed rule that depends only on the total outstanding number of shares sold in the market. Cost function market makers encompass a wide class of markets, and of particular significance is the fact that market scoring rules can be reformulated as cost functions [1, 3] . The ease of organizing a market based on a cost function has led to its use in many real settings, especially in combinatorial prediction markets. Our main observation is that such markets immediately satisfy the smoothness condition developed earlier in this paper for information aggregation. Further, in many of these markets, the loss to the market maker is bounded on any path of the market, and thus the information aggregation result of the preceding section applies if signal spaces are finite.
Let qt(ω) denote the total quantity of the security ω sold by the market maker until time t. We have the following relation between qt and the trades {yτ , 1 ≤ τ ≤ t} that have occurred up to time t:
A cost function market maker is defined by a continuously differentiable function C : R m → R. After any history ht, the market maker prices the trades at time t according to
Note that the condition imposed by (1) on the pricing function K requires the cost function C to satisfy C(q + a1) = C(q) + a, for all a ∈ R. Markets based on cost functions are a special case of the market studied in this paper. In particular, the market maker's pricing function depends on the history only through the total quantity of securities sold up to that time. Also, observe that the total revenue obtained by the market maker at time t is given by: 
This shows that at any instant the total revenue of the market maker is dependent only on the total quantity of the security sold by the market maker, and not on the actual sequence of trades leading to the final position. Differentiability of the cost function then yields the following information aggregation result.
Theorem 3. Given a cost function market maker and a PBE with strategy profile δ satisfying portfolio convergence (Assumption 2), the market aggregates the information of the traders.
Proof. The proof involves showing that any PBE of a cost function market satisfies the asymptotic smoothness condition.
For a PBE with strategy profile δ, we first define Γ(q 
Also, as the total quantity of the securities sold by the market maker at time t equals the sum of the net change in the portfolio of all the traders and the total revenue obtained by the market maker, we get
This implies that, Γ(q m , where the function K(h∞, ·) is continuously differentiable. This proves that asymptotic smoothness holds in this case, implying through Theorem 1 that information aggregation is obtained.
